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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
COMPETITION AND R&D
Theoretical Approaches and Quantitative Results
This study is an attempt to examine and model the relationship between (the pres-
ence and intensity of ) competition and corporate level R&D expenditures. Hungarian 
firm-level and industry-level data populate the empirical models. A brief summary of 
the history of research on the much-debated competition-innovation relationship is 
also offered. Results from the earliest studies seem to suggest that stronger compe-
tition generally results in lower levels of innovation, while the empirical results that 
were born in the 1990s showed some evidence for the opposite relationship. The 
seminal model of Aghion et al. [2005] indicated an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between the intensity of competition and the level of innovation. A discussion of the 
difficulties of measuring the pertinent variables and the relationship among them is 
followed by an elaborate investigation of the shape of the relationship. Based on our 
extensive empirical results, we conclude that the inverted-U shaped relationship can 
indeed be established in Hungary at the industry-level as well as at the firm-level. We 
also demonstrate that only certain types of indicators of the presence and intensity 
of competition seem to have had a detectable relationship with the innovative in-
vestments of firms.
INTRODUCTION
In economics, an issue of great interest concerns the factors affecting economic 
growth in the long run. Since the appearance of modern growth theory, the relative 
importance of capital accumulation and productivity growth has been continuously 
debated (the latter factor, at least partially, reflecting technological development). 
Since Robert Solow started his research programme in the 1950s1, the key role of 
productivity growth has become evident. As shown by recent results, in the 20th 
century it contributed to annual average economic growth by over 1% (Abramo-
vitz–David [2001]).
The Solow model, however, assumes that technological change depends on “ex-
ogeneous” factors, that is, factors outside the model. This is true inasmuch as the 
development of science and technology depends to a great extent on phenomena 
such as the knowable nature, complexity, or interrelatedness of natural laws.
 1 Romer [1996] in Chapter 1 gives a detailed and up-to-date description of the Solow model.
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Endogeneous growth theory models, however, also take into account the fact 
that social institutions influence technological development (Aghion–Howitt [1998]). 
In market economies, technological development is attributed, above all, to the fact 
that firms decide to introduce new technologies in a decentralized way – in other 
words, they innovate. Therefore, in such economies the impact of social-economic 
institutions on technological development primarily means that institutions influ-
ence the firms’ incentives to perform R&D and introduce innovations. Among the 
features of institutions and economic environment it is most probably competition 
whose impact on innovation and growth has been most thoroughly discussed by 
economists. This was due to the strong economic intuition that monopolies and 
highly competitive firms benefit from the development of production technology 
or the introduction of new products to different degrees.
This study seeks, above all, to describe the nature of this relationship. After 
discussing some dilemmas concerning the definition of innovation, it deals with 
the logic and predictions of the key theoretical models related to the issue. Then 
it offers details of empirical methods and key results on the relationship between 
innovation and competition, followed by the empirical analysis of the relationship 
between competition and the R&D expenditures of Hungarian firms. The study 
closes with a summary of conclusions.
THE CONCEPT OF INNOVATION
The economics literature places great emphasis on differentiating between inno-
vation and research and development. Since Schumpeter’s works were published, 
innovation has been interpreted as the actual implementation of an improvement, 
be it either the market introduction of a new product or the use of a new procedure 
during production. The former is product innovation, the latter is process innovation, 
and research and development may mean the development of either a product or 
a process. In other words, R&D is an input to the innovation process; research itself, 
however, is not innovation until its results appear on the market or in the produc-
tion process (Fagerberg [2006]).
The definition of innovation given in the Community Innovation Survey, CIS of 
the European Union falls in line with the above:
• It follows that research and development (R&D) itself is not innovation but expendi-
ture on innovation. And this is not the only expenditure of this kind. Innovation inputs 
also include when a firm purchases machines to implement its innovations or when 
managers make extra efforts to prepare the introduction of new processes or products. 
What is more, it is possible that the firm itself does not perform R&D activity yet it can 
still introduce new products or services relying, for example, on technology transfer.
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This is especially true for small open economies and for countries which do 
not belong to the technology frontier. For such economies, implementing foreign 
technologies and products is a key to growth, and thus, it must be a focus of in-
novation policy. The significance of the issue is evidenced by the fact that while 
in Hungary approximately 10% of the firms that were included in the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) performed research and development activity on a con-
tinuous basis between 2004 and 2006, more than 30% of them introduced product 
or process innovation in the same period (Halpern–Muraközy [2010]). These data 
show that in Hungary, in most cases, innovation is performed without any formal 
research and development activity. It is evident, however, that such innovations 
require resources from the managers and employees of a firm. Yet such innova-
tion efforts are not included in the R&D statistics, which means that in follower 
countries R&D statistics may significantly underestimate the actual innovation 
expenditures of firms.
THE THEORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION  
AND INNOVATION
The beginnings of research on the relationship between competition and innovation 
can be traced back, above all, to Josef Schumpeter’s (1883–1950) research. In his 
early works, Schumpeter emphasized that new innovative entrepreneurs can break 
the “inertia” or “laziness” of large companies. The market entry and subsequent 
growth of such small enterprises explain the phenomenon of economic growth. 
Schumpeter termed this process “creative destruction.”
Schumpeter’s later works focused on the economies of scale that are achieva-
ble by big businesses in research and development and innovation. The difference 
between the two approaches can be interpreted in various ways. First, it can be 
regarded as a historical change: the growth of scientific knowledge generated eco-
nomics of scale in research. Another interpretation is that the two Schumpeterian 
models describe different industries. In some industries, small firms carry innovative 
solutions (e.g. the Internet). In others, only large firms are capable of introducing 
innovations (e.g. the pharmaceutical industry), because of the high costs of intro-
ducing each innovation.
In and after the 1960s, based on Schumpeter’s concepts and parallel with the 
appearance of game theory-based industrial organization models, a number of anal-
yses have been published that examine the relationship between market structure 
and innovation with the aid of models of the strategic behaviour of firms. These 
models regard R&D as investment and, practically, do not differentiate between 
decisions on R&D and decisions on innovation. As a rule, the assumed decision 
making consists of two steps. First, a firm decides about the dimensions of its R&D 
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investment; second, it sells the new product (in case of product innovation) or, 
employing a new procedure, produces more efficiently (in case of process innova-
tion). Competition starts playing a role in the second step. The type of the product 
market competition (e.g. Bertrand or Cournot competition) and its strength define 
the revenues of a given firm on the market. Firms make decisions about their R&D 
investment based on the profit they will realize in the second phase; that is, they 
compare the profits achievable with innovation and without innovation. For ex-
ample, when strong competition decreases the amount of profit that is achievable 
by innovation, R&D investments and the innovation performance will be lower in 
competitive industries.
In the “standard” industrial organization model of innovation – regardless of 
the exact structure of the model – weaker competition (e.g. a monopoly) ensures 
higher profits for the innovating firm, and, therefore, the innovation level is expect-
ed to be higher (for a description, see Aghion–Griffith [2005], Chapter 1.1). When 
competition is stronger, the firm reaches fewer consumers, sets lower prices and, as 
a result, it becomes less profitable for it to invest in research. Therefore, the models 
introduced before the 1990s corroborated the existence of the Schumpeterian effect 
inasmuch as they showed that monopolized industries are innovative and thus are 
closer to social optimum.
It follows from these theoretical results that in monopolized industries technol-
ogy develops faster, which means that competition policy has to choose between 
static and dynamic efficiency or, in other words, has to face a difficult trade-off. 
But in the 1990s empirical research came to a different conclusion: the research 
of Geroski [1990], [1995], Nickel [1996], and Blundell et al. [1999] evidenced that 
in a given industry the stronger the competition, the higher the productivity gains, 
that is, the stronger the incentive to innovative.
The seminal study of Aghion et al. [2005] was based on endogenous growth 
theory and worked with a different approach, relying on the heterogeneity of firms 
and on nonlinear relationships. Their model shows that the response of firms to 
competition can take many different forms. When competition intensifies, firms 
on the technology frontier increase their R&D, while firms lagging behind reduce 
their innovative effort. Taking into consideration the resulting industry dynamics, 
the authors highlight that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the 
strength of competition and innovation at the industry level: in case of weak com-
petition they are positively related, while in case of strong competition the associ-
ation will be negative.
The model presented by Aghion et al. involves multiple time periods. Techno-
logical development takes place step by step. The most developed technology is 
improving to the same degree in every period, independently of the firms modelled. 
Some firms have the most developed technologies, while others are some steps be-
hind. When a firm introduces a successful innovation, it can take one step forward, 
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otherwise it will start lagging behind even more. 2 This firm faces competitors that 
are always one step behind the most developed technology at the given time.
If the firm uses the most developed technology, then – given that the production 
costs of the competitors are necessarily higher – it is in the position to set monopoly 
prices or, rather, prices that correspond to the expenditure level of the other firms. 
In case the firm in question is two steps behind the most developed technology, its 
competitors will be ahead of it, so it will not be able to sell its product. In this model, 
competition is regarded as the profit level of a firm which employs technologies as 
developed as those of its competitors; the stronger the competition, the lower the 
profit of such a firm.
A key concept presented by the authors is that those firms that use the most 
developed technology respond differently to strengthening competition than those 
lagging behind. Innovation incentive is the amount their profit would (is expected 
to) rise if they increased their innovation expenditure. Profit levels achieved with 
and without innovation are to be compared. Non-linearity is caused by the fact that 
competition affects both kinds of profit.
If innovation proves to be successful, firms on the technology frontier will be 
able to produce with the new technology, otherwise other firms catch up to them. 
The stronger the competition, being caught up by competitors will be the more 
painful. Consequently, in response to stronger competition firms that use the most 
developed technology increase their R&D expenditure to escape competition.
The situation is reversed for firms that lag behind. They are assumed to be able 
to make only one step forward in the process technology development. By doing 
so, they can indeed catch up with other firms but have no chance to leave them 
behind. Stronger competition means that it is less attractive to catch up to others, 
and consequently R&D investment is less attractive. The reason for this is that in 
case of successful innovation the firm will realize lower profit when competing with 
other firms which are at the same level of development. This means that the firms 
lagging behind are influenced by the Schumpeterian effect:3 Innovation is a decreas-
ing function of the strength of competition.
Which effect is stronger? The answer depends on the ratio of industries in equi-
librium where firms are close to each other (and, consequently, the competition 
 2 A key sectoral factor is the intensity of competition in the product market, which is measured by 
the authors as the difference between the expenditure of firms that employ the most developed 
technology and that of other firms. It may be caused by various phenomena. Primarily, greater 
intensity is understood as greater substitutability among products produced in the given indus-
try. Where competition (substitution) is stronger, a leader firm has a higher profit than a follower, 
as in such industries prices are more important for consumers. This definition falls in line with 
the logic employed above: the strength of the competition is linked to the profit from innovation 
(relative to profit achieved without innovation), and thus it may affect R&D expenditure.
 3 The term “Schumpeterian” here refers to the second phase of Schumpeter’s scientific activity.
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deterrence effect is strong) to industries where there is a greater difference be-
tween firms (and, therefore, the Schumpeterian effect is stronger). As competition 
strengthens, the level of innovative activity increases at first, and then starts to 
decrease. The relationship between the two phenomena resembles an inverted-U 
shape or a bell curve. The monopolies as well as the industries where competition 
is very strong tend to be less innovative than sectors with a low number of actors.
The model built by Aghion at al. [2009] in this kind of a framework indicates that 
the increased probability of the entry of new actors who use the most developed 
technology also has an inverted-U shaped relationship with innovative activity in 
the industry. In this model, the innovation efforts made by firms at the technological 
frontier intensify as the probability of entry by competitors increases. This entry 
deterrence effect is analogous with the competition escape effect in the previous 
model. Conversely, the innovation efforts of firms that use less developed technology 
decrease as the probability of entry increases. Their expected profit from successful 
innovation is lower if they are more likely to face a competitor which uses a more 
developed technology than theirs. It follows from the way the equilibrium ratio of 
sectors is defined that the relationship between competition (defined as the prob-
ability of entry) and the innovative effort is expected to take an inverted-U shape.4
The models discussed so far (with the exception perhaps of Schumpeter’s mod-
el) are neoclassical models. The firms are assumed to be well informed and, based 
on their knowledge, they make perfectly rational decisions about innovation and 
everything else. In neoclassical models, even though the outcome of innovation 
decisions is uncertain, the firms are perfectly aware of the possible returns on in-
vestment and the probability of their occurrence.
Studies on evolutionary models5 suggest that this kind of neoclassical model 
is not suitable for an adequate modelling of innovative behaviour as the payoff of 
innovation is basically uncertain and the actors are not likely to know the proba-
bility distribution of payoffs. This is Knightian uncertainty (Knight [1921]). Given 
the above, it is not justified to assume that firms make perfectly optimal decisions. 
Instead, they use a heuristic approach or some other, bounded rational decision 
making mechanisms when deciding about research fields and the amount to be in-
vested. Among the firms that use various decision making procedures, those with 
higher profits grow faster, as they are in the position to invest more. In time, poor 
performers go bankrupt.
A key feature of these models is that firms differ from each other in various 
dimensions. As opposed to neoclassical models, they do not postulate that some 
 4 Recently, several other studies have discussed the issue of entry and innovation: Asker–Baccara 
[2010], Creane–Miyagiwa [2009], Grossman–Steger [2007], Kovac–Vinogradov–Zigic [2010], Miller 
[2007].
 5 Nelson–Winter [2002] gives an overview of the main issues concerning evolutionary models. The 
first of the evolutionary models concerning innovation is Nelson–Winter [1982]. 
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firms are one or two steps behind the others, rather, that firms in the market have 
different information and employ different decision making mechanisms. A relat-
ed issue is path dependence: the situation of firms or industries that take different 
directions may differ radically.
Evolutionary logic sheds light on the fact that industry productivity can grow not 
only when a firm introduces new products or processes, but also when the market 
share of firms with good “genes” or expert knowledge grows, while that of worse 
performers decreases. (Some of them leave the market). Motta [2004] (pp. 55–64) 
presents a simple model of this kind.
EMPIRICAL METHODS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Measuring the relationship between competition and innovation
Research on the relationship between competition and innovation raises several 
problems (Aghion–Griffith [2005] Chapter 1.2.2). First, besides the strength of com-
petition there are several other factors that define how much a firm or an industry 
invests in innovation. These variables may easily be correlated with competition 
and, for analytical purposes, they must be taken into account.
Second, the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry 
is not a one-way causal relationship; rather, it is simultaneous, which means that 
innovation also influences market structure. In general, panel data are needed to 
handle simultaneity. When such data are available – and it is assumed that market 
structure is pre-determined (that is, innovation in a given period of time affects 
only future market structure) – the issue of simultaneity can be handled with the 
use of lagged explanatory variables. Weaker assumptions are needed when, for the 
purposes of analysis, exogenous changes of economic policy and regulation (e.g. 
free trade agreements) are used as instrumental variables (e.g. Aghion et al. [2005]).
Third, a major issue is that of measurement errors in explanatory variables. The 
analyst is interested in the impact on innovation of competition. The indicators that 
describe the market structure (number of firms, concentration, etc.) do not measure 
competition directly. This problem is aggravated by the fact that in open economies 
external competition needs also be taken into account in some way. Consequently, 
in theory it is more practical to use an indicator that has a more direct link with 
competitive pressure than market structure does. Such indicators include the Lern-
er-index or some other indicator of the market power of firms.
Fourth, the selection of the dependent variable (a measure of innovation) is not 
an easy task either. As referred to above, R&D activity is an input to innovation, not 
a measure of innovation itself. While for large companies it may have a strong corre-
lation with innovation, smaller firms may introduce important innovations without 
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spending on R&D. As for the outputs of innovation, the number of patents is the 
measure most widely used. The main problem with this is that not every patent is 
of equal significance or entails the same level of innovation. Therefore, researchers 
often decide to weight the number of patents by the number of times it has been 
referred to in another patent (Jaffe [1986]). Theoretically variables showing inno-
vation output (from innovation surveys) are better measures than the numbers of 
patents. This holds especially true for countries which are not at the technology 
frontier, therefore, the majority of innovations do not entail patent registration. In 
practice, however, in most countries these indicators are available only on a relatively 
small sample of firms and, therefore, fail to reflect the total innovative performance 
of the economy. When there are no available indicators that directly show spending 
on and results of innovation, then innovation may be approximated with variables 
indirectly related to innovation. Such variables include, for example, the produc-
tivity of the firm in question (labour productivity or total factor productivity, TFP). 
Nevertheless, productivity gains depend on several other variables beside technol-
ogy. For example, it is often difficult to filter out the effect of the economies of scale.
The nature of the measurement of innovation also affects the appropriate esti-
mation methods. For R&D expenditures, for example, the value is zero for a large 
number of firms; consequently, a tobit model is to be used. When we ask which firm 
introduced innovation, then probit or logit models may be used.
Fifth, as Aghion at al. [2005] state, the relationship between competition and 
innovation is not necessarily linear (Chapter 3.1). According to Aghion–Griffith 
[2005], the results of some early studies contradict each other from time to time, as 
the authors did not consider this possibility and examined only the linear effects of 
the competition variable. Nonlinearity is to be dealt with by using quadratic terms 
or nonparametric models.
Empirical results
Ahn [2002] and Aghion–Griffith [2005] offer a summary of the specialized literature 
on innovation published in the 1990s. These empirical studies failed to corroborate 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the presence of large firms or a greater concen-
tration may lead to higher levels of innovation. A number of studies state that there 
is a strong positive relationship between competition in the product market and 
productivity. Further research has shown that the effect of different changes in the 
economic environment – regulatory changes, greater exposure to global competition, 
the introduction of competition for non-profit enterprises – justify that competition 
contributes to productivity, wealth and long-term growth. It is also pointed out that 
it often takes a long time for enterprises and consumers to adjust to a new context 
and for the competition to fully exercise its positive impact on efficiency.
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Major articles of the 1990s include those by Geroski [1990], [1991], [1994], Blun-
dell et al. [1995], [1999]. These studies examined the firm-level and industry-level 
panel data of the 1970s and 1980s, and revealed that competition has a positive im-
pact on innovation. Pohlmeier [1992], taking into consideration the fact that this is 
a simultaneous relationship, found – instead of the theoretically assumed positive 
relationship – a negative relationship between market concentration and product 
and process innovation in 2,200 German firms by 1984. Crépon at al. [1996] analyz-
ed the 1991 data of approximately 10,000 firms. Results on the relationship between 
market concentration and innovation differed depending on which innovation in-
dicator was used. When the number of patents and other performance indicators 
of innovation were used, a negative relationship was established with market con-
centration, while in the case of the sale of new products a positive relationship was 
found. As for R&D investment, no relationship was established.
As mentioned in the theoretical summary: Aghion et al. [2005] showed that, 
theoretically, an inverted-U shaped relationship is possible between competition 
and innovation. Aghion and his colleagues performed empirical studies which es-
tablished the inverted-U shaped relationship between product market competition 
(measured with the Lerner index) and innovation (measured with the number of 
patents). As it was referred to above, in a later study they described a similar the-
oretical relationship between the probability of entry and the level of innovation 
(Aghion et al. [2009]). Positive relationship was also indicated by panel data on UK 
firms for the period between 1987 and 1993. The effect of market entry analyzed 
at the four-digit industry level (especially foreign market entry) is positive in indus-
tries where the UK is on the technology frontier, and weak or negative in industries 
which lag behind. In line with the theoretical model, the results indicate that the 
relationship between competition and innovation may also be affected by the dis-
tance to the technological frontier.
Later, other studies also corroborated the hypothesis of the inverted-U shaped 
relationship. For example, Tingvall–Polsdahl [2006] quantified such a relationship 
between competition (measured by the Herfindahl index) and innovation on data 
gathered in Sweden between 1990 and 2000; however, no significant results were 
found for the price-cost margin. Brouwer–Van der Wiel [2010] succeeded in estab-
lishing a clear positive relationship between competition and total factor produc-
tivity for Dutch industries. In addition, for the Netherlands – at least for the man-
ufacturing industry – these authors provided evidence for the inverted-U shaped 
relationship between competition and innovation, in other words, for the fact that 
competition (if significantly stronger than observed) has a negative impact on pro-
ductivity because of the lower innovation expenditure. The reverse relationship did 
not show up in the data, which means that the intensity of competition does not 
decrease because of innovation.
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From the models establishing an inverted-U shape, it can be concluded that the 
shape of the relationship is influenced by the distance of the firms of a country to 
the technological frontier. Acemoglu et al. [2006] studied, among others, this issue 
and observed a positive correlation between the cross-sectional productivity and 
R&D expenditure of a country, as well as between the distance to the technolog-
ical frontier and R&D expenditure. The growth rate of countries where – due to 
high barriers to entry – competition is weak falls more sharply when the country 
in question gets closer to the technological frontier than the growth rate of coun-
tries with strong competition. The weakness of competition exercises its adverse 
effects in countries which are close to the technological frontier. Lee [2009] came 
to similar conclusions. Relying on the data of more than 1,000 Canadian, Japanese, 
South-Korean, Taiwanese, Indian and Chinese businesses, he concluded that the 
way firms respond to competitive pressure depends on the level of their techno-
logical expertise: firms at a higher level step up their R&D efforts, while those at 
a lower level reduce them.
To sum up, the empirical results of the last two decades have corroborated that 
competition has a basically positive impact on innovation. Nevertheless, numerous 
problems with the measurement and empirical methodology have not been properly 
solved. The creation of targeted corporate databases on innovation is a huge step for-
ward, yet problems (such as measuring competition in an industry, the management 
of international relations or the adequate consideration of lagged effects) still persist.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 
IN HUNGARY
Data
Our major data source was the database of the Hungarian Tax Authority, more 
specifically, the data from the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of firms 
with double-entry accounting from the period between 1992 and 2006. Table A1 
in the Appendix shows the distribution of the firms contained in the database (by 
industry and size). From 2000 onwards, sampling has been designed to ensure that 
all large companies and exporting firms are included without exception; however, 
numerous smaller firms were omitted. The firms in the sample represent more than 
90% of employees, turnover and export. As only a very low number of micro firms 
perform R&D activities, firms with less than 5 employees were excluded from the 
sample. We perform our analysis in the manufacturing, as the relationship between 
competition and innovation is easier to measure and interpret in this industry than 
in services. As in certain cases we used lagged variables as well, we restricted the 
sample to those firms that were included in the database both in 2003 and 2005. 
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Finally, for the purpose of data cleansing, we excluded from the analysis firms with 
a negative value added.
The database contains four-digit NACE number industry classification of the 
firms, the number of employees and the balance sheet data. Unfortunately, NACE 
industries do not necessarily correspond to markets as interpreted in industrial 
organization or competition policy. An industry may consists of several separate 
markets or a firm may perform productive activity in more than one industry, which 
then may result in a certain bias during the measurement of the effects of competi-
tion. We approximate the innovation efforts of businesses with R&D expenditures 
between 2003 and 2005.
Table A2 of the Annex shows the summary statistics of the explanatory variables. 
R&D intensity measures the firm’s R&D expenditure relative to its turnover. Value 
added is calculated from the balance sheet. Labour productivity is the ratio of cor-
porate value added and the number of employees. Capital intensity is the value of 
tangible assets per employee. Data include information on foreign ownership share. 
We created a binary dummy variable. When its value is 1, it indicates that at least 
10% of the company’s equity is owned by foreigners. Data also give information on 
the firm’s export activity. Again, we created a binary dummy variable. When its 
value is 1, it indicates that the firm performs export activities.
Variables that measure competition can also be defined from the database. We 
calculated the indicator C3 to show the share of the three largest companies from 
the industry’s turnover. The Hirschman–Herfindahl index, calculated on the basis 
of turnover, is an alternative measure for concentration. As mentioned above, the 
concentration variables often fail to measure the market power accurately. There-
fore, we also used the indicator ROA (return on assets) to show the ratio of a firm’s 
pre-tax profit to its assets.
Other indicators in the competition database of the Hungarian Competition 
Authority (Hungarian acronym: GVH) were also used as alternative indicators of 
the strength of competition.6
Models
The question is: What is the impact of competition on the innovation of firms? In 
our basic model, the (firm- or industry-level) R&D activity is the dependent var-
iable, while the explanatory variables include measures of competition as well as 
control variables.
Three models have been estimated. In the first one, industry-level R&D intensity 
was modelled with industry competition variables and other explanatory variables. 
Aghion et al. [2005] employed a similar industry-level analysis.
 6 http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&st=1&pg=54&m5_doc=5635&m251_act=4.
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 R&D intensityj, 2005 = α + βcompetitionj, 2005 + γXj, 2005 + εj, 2005 (1)
where j indicates industries; the time index indicates the fact that we used cross-sec-
tional data of the year 2005 for the analysis; R&D intensityj, 2005 is the industry’s 
average R&D intensity; competitionj, 2005 is an indicator of the competition; Xj, 2005 
contains other sectoral-level explanatory variables (labour productivity, capital in-
tensity); and εj, 2005 is random error. In the model, β shows the impact of competition 
on the R&D intensity of the industry.
We run the other two models at the firm level. In the first case, the dependent 
variable indicates whether the firm in question performed R&D activity in 2005. As 
the dependent variable is binary, we used a probit model.
 P(RDi, 2005) = F(α + βcompetitionj, 2005 + γXj, 2005 + δZi, 2005 + εj, 2005) (2)
where i stands for the firm and j for the firm’s industry, as the competition variable 
can be interpreted at the industry level. Xj, 2005 contains industry control variables 
(binary industry dummies based on two-digit codes). Zi, 2005 contains some features 
of the firm (labour productivity, size and capital intensity). As the dependent vari-
able is binary, the model can be interpreted as the probability of R&D activity. The 
function F(x) is the normal distribution function.
In the last model, the dependent variable is the firm-level R&D intensity:
 RDi, 2005 = α + βcompetitionj, 2005 + γXj, 2005 + δZi, 2005 + εj, 2005 (3)
As a large number of firms do not perform R&D activity – and, thus, the dependent 
variable is zero for them – this equation is estimated with a tobit model.
The first question is: How can we take into account the various variables that may 
possibly influence the dependent variable? A major problem may arise when at the 
industry level the nature of technology is such that it is related to the competition 
variable. Industrial technology is approximated by productivity and capital intensity. 
Here, the impact of the competition variable is identified from the comparison of the 
industries which use similar technologies. In the firm-level models, the heterogene-
ity of the industry is depicted with the aid of two-digit industrial codes. We address 
the issue of firm heterogeneity with the introduction of size dummies and variables 
measuring firm productivity, export status, foreign ownership and capital intensity. 
In the firm-level regressions some explanatory variables are industry-level variables, 
which may cause heteroskedasticity. We handle this with clustered standard errors.
The second question pertains to the issue of endogeneity; in other words, the 
fact that innovation in a given year is determined simultaneously with market struc-
ture. They mutually influence each other. To handle this, we ran all regressions with 
lagged explanatory variables (from 2003). Since innovation in year 2005 cannot af-
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION AND R&D THEORETICAL APPROACHES 125
fect the market structure variables in year 2003, we hope that the coefficients thus 
derived exhibit a causal relationship.
The third question is that of measuring competition. First, we performed all 
measurements with three competition variables. Two of them approximate the mar-
ket structure, while ROA approximates the profit margin. After that, the firm-level 
regression is run on all variables of the competition statistics database of the Hun-
garian Competition Authority.
The fourth question pertains to the variable that reflects innovation. In this 
respect, the best solution would be to use the definition of innovation given in the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Union. However, as it is avail-
able only for a relatively small sample of firms, we decided to use the R&D value of 
year 2005, which was available for all firms.
Finally, as Aghion et al. [2005] (Chapter 3.1) emphasize this, the relationship 
between competition and innovation is not necessarily linear. To examine this re-
lationship, we also estimated the model using a quadratic specification. The invert-
ed-U shape is corroborated if the coefficient of the linear term is positive and that 
of the quadratic term is negative.
Results
Table A2 of the Annex contains the key summary statistics. It demonstrates that 
out of the 7,575 firms of the sample, only 256 (3.4%) performed R&D activities in 
2005. By international comparison, this rate is very low, but – as mentioned in the 
first section – the true rate of innovative firms was higher. Approximately one-fifth 
of the firms in the sample were in foreign ownership and more than half of them 
performed export activity.
The first glimpse on the relationship between competition and innovation is 
given in Table 1. Based on the strength of the competition, we categorized the 
four-digit industries into four quartiles. In each column, we used a different com-
petition indicator for the purpose of categorization. The numbers indicated in the 
TABLE 1 • Concentration and average R&D intensity, 2005
NACE4 industries Concentration (C3) Herfindahl index ROA
1st quartile 0.096 0.096 0.092
2nd quartile 0.136 0.280 0.138
3rd quartile 0.350 0.196 0.140
4th quartile 0.043 0.053 0.257
F-test 4.24 2.36 1.1
p-value 0.006 0.072 0.348
Note: The Table shows the average R&D intensity in the industry quartiles defined on the basis 
of competition indicators. The F-test examines the hypothesis that these are equal.
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Table show the average R&D intensity of the firms that fall into the given quartile. 
The bottom rows show the results of the F-test whose null hypothesis, that the in-
dustries belonging to each quartile exhibit the same average R&D intensity, could 
not be rejected.
The results shown in the table indicate significant differences between the quar-
tiles for the two concentration indicators. This pattern falls in line with the model 
and empirical results of Aghion et al. [2005]: the relationship is depicted by an invert-
ed-U shaped curve. R&D intensity is the highest in those industries where competi-
tion is of medium strength. However, there is no significant difference between the 
R&D intensity of the sectors in terms of the quartiles defined on the basis of ROA.
The relationship between average R&D intensity of the industries and competi-
tion was also examined with the industry-level regression shown in equation (1). The 
results are presented in Table 2. This Table contains three equations for all the three 
competition indicators. The first equation contains only the competition indicator. 
The second equation contains industry productivity and capital intensity as well, 
and thus takes into consideration the technological features of the industry. In the 
third equation, by including the square of the competition indicator, competition 
is allowed to have a non-linear impact on the dependent variable.
TABLE 2 • Impact of competition on the R&D intensity in the industry
Variable OLS Extended Quadratic OLS Extended Quadratic OLS Extended Quadratic
Concentration (C3) 0.042
(0.075)
0.006
(0.068)
1.685***
(0.575)
Concentration2 (C3)2 –1.313***
(0.439)
Herfindahl index –0.126**
(0.053)
–0.154**
(0.067)
0.506*
(0.293)
Herfindahl index2 –0.668**
(0.296)
Average ROA in industry 0.214
(0.385)
0.126
(0.344)
1.624
(1.330)
ROA2 –3.657
(2.531)
Labour productivity 0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
Log capital intensity 0.051
(0.047)
0.052
(0.046)
0.053
(0.048)
0.041
(0.047)
0.051
(0.047)
0.049
(0.046)
Constant 0.127***
(0.047)
0.070
(0.073)
–0.377**
(0.188)
0.201***
(0.047)
0.12**
(0.052)
0.044
(0.061)
0.141***
(0.031)
0.066
(0.068)
–0.003
(0.103)
Number of observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 231
R2 0.000 0.007 0.031 0.005 0.015 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.018
Note: The dependent variable is the average R&D intensity of the industry (in percentage). The observation units are four-digit 
industries.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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In line with the descriptive statistics, for C3 and for the Herfindahl index the 
results show an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and R&D in-
tensity. The results for the ROA indicator are not significant. To examine robustness, 
we ran the same regressions on industry-level data aggregated to three digits, and 
the results were the same. To handle the issue of simultaneity between competition 
and innovation, we performed the calculations with lagged explanatory variables 
as well, and came to the same conclusions.
Overall, it was found that the industry-level data support the hypothesis of the 
inverted-U shaped curve. The low explanatory power of the models, however, in-
dicates that (albeit competition does have an impact on R&D expenditure) tech-
nological and other differences between industries play a much more decisive role.
We now turn to the firm-level regressions. Table 3 shows our estimation results 
for equations (2) and (3). The dependent variable is the probability of a positive 
TABLE 3 • Impact of competition on the R&D of firms
Variable Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Concentration (C3) 0.007**
(0.003)
3.191
(1.267)
Herfindahl index 0.005
(0.004)
1.923
(1.374)
Average ROA in industry 0.010
(0.015)
2.725
(5.316)
Labour productivity 0.000
(0.000)
0.038
(0.048)
0.000
(0.000)
0.040
(0.049)
0.000
(0.000)
0.042
(0.051)
Log capital intensity 0.001**
(0.001)
0.506**
(0.235)
0.001***
(0.001)
0.526**
(0.239)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.55**
(0.242)
Size: 25–50
0.03***
(0.006)
5.882***
(1.373)
0.03***
(0.007)
5.846***
(1.369)
0.03***
(0.007)
5.813***
(1.367)
Size: 50–250 0.073***
(0.010)
7.825**
(1.336)
0.073***
(0.011)
7.81***
(1.335)
0.073***
(0.011)
7.774***
(1.332)
Size: 250 0.269***
(0.035)
11.079***
(1.804)
0.274***
(0.036)
11.116***
(1.809)
0.276***
(0.036)
11.136***
(1.817)
Exporter 0.006***
(0.002)
2.617**
(1.058)
0.007***
(0.002)
2.695**
(1.077)
0.007**
(0.002)
2.751**
(1.080)
Foreign ownership > 10 % –0.003***
(0.001)
–1.325**
(0.646)
–0.003***
(0.001)
–1.27**
(0.642)
–0.003**
(0.001)
–1.285**
(0.646)
Constant –22.37***
(4.150)
–21.315***
(3.921)
–21.24***
(3.880)
Observations 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575
Pseudo R2 0.342 0.218 0.339 0.216 0.338 0.215
Log Likelihood –726.1 –1267 –728.8 –1271 –729.6 –1272
Note: The dependent variable of the probit models indicates whether the firm in question performed R&D activity in 2005. The 
dependent variable of the tobit models show the firms’ R&D intensity (in %). For the probit models, the table shows the average 
marginal effects at the sample mean. We calculated competition variables for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also include 
two-digit industry dummies. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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R&D expenditure in the probit columns, and the firms’ R&D intensity in the tobit 
columns. For the probit model, the table contains the average marginal effect of the 
variables at the sample mean. The equations contain two-digit industry dummies 
as well; however, the table does not show the point estimates for them.
Larger firms with higher capital intensity that perform export activity have 
a higher-level innovative activity. An interesting result is that productivity does 
not affect R&D decisions when size and capital intensity are taken into consider-
ation. Another surprising finding is that foreign-owned firms ceteris paribus per-
form less R&D than those owned by Hungarians. Our study Halpern–Muraközy 
[2010] established neither a negative nor a positive impact on the data taken from 
the Community Innovation Survey of the European Union. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the innovation expenditure of foreign business in Hungary exhibit 
only a weak correlation to the innovations implemented in Hungary.
As for the competition indicators, only the concentration indicator (C3) is sig-
nificant. It is positive, which means that firms in the relatively more concentrated 
industries are more likely to perform R&D, and their R&D intensity is higher. The 
Herfindahl index and ROA are not significant.
As indicated by the industry-level regressions, a possible reason is that the rela-
tionship between competition and innovation is not linear. Table 4 shows the results 
of the estimation which involves a quadratic term in the equation. With regard to the 
competition indicators, an inverted-U shaped relationship was established for the 
concentration indicator (C3) and the Herfindahl index. In this model, no significant 
effect was revealed for ROA. Table A3 of the Appendix shows the results achieved 
with the use of lagged explanatory variables. The results of these specifications are 
similar to those of the previous estimations, but the coefficients of the competition 
variables are not as significant. For the other variables, the results are the same.
It has been mentioned above that concentration indicators are not necessarily 
the best tools to measure the strength of the competition actually affecting the mar-
ket. Therefore, it is of great importance to examine which competition indicators 
are linked to the innovation efforts of firms and to what extent. For this purpose, 
we estimated equation (2) for 70 further competition indicators of the competition 
statistics database of the Hungarian Competition Authority. For the purposes of esti-
mation  – to handle the problem of simultaneity – we used the lagged values (of year 
2003) of the indicators. Table A4 of the Appendix shows the marginal effect of the 
competition indicators and their squares in the sample mean for the R&D binary value.
The results corroborate the conclusion that the concentration variables show-
ing the share of the biggest companies are in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with the innovation efforts of firms. The results were affected only to a small de-
gree by whether concentration was calculated on the basis of assets or turnover. 
The strength or the direction of the relationship is not affected by whether the 
indicator shows the share of the three, five or ten largest firms. Interestingly, for 
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the concentration indicators that measure domestic consumption, no significant 
impact has been established. Similarly, the Herfindahl index (from the database of 
the Hungarian Competition Authority) does not exhibit a significant relationship 
with innovation expenditure.
Among other indicators, it is the industrial dynamics variable that has a sig-
nificant impact on R&D expenditure: the intensity of entry and exit is in a convex 
TABLE 4 • Non-linear impact of competition on the R&D of firms
Variable Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Concentration (C3) 0.027**
(0.011)
13.659**
(5.306)
Concentration2 (C3)2 –0.018*
(0.009)
–9.178**
(4.382)
Herfindahl index 0.019*
(0.011)
9.721**
(4.624)
Herfindahl index2 –0.018
(0.012)
–10.009**
(5.098)
Average ROA in industry 0.009
(0.038)
2.964
(13.054)
ROA2 0.006
(0.090)
–0.687
(30.215)
Labour productivity 0.000
(0.000)
0.042
(0.049)
0.000
(0.000)
0.044
(0.051)
0.000
(0.000)
0.042
(0.051)
Log capital intensity 0.001**
(0.001)
0.516**
(0.237)
0.001***
(0.001)
0.524** 0.001***
(0.001) 
0.551**
(0.242)
(0.238)
Size: 25–50 0.03***
(0.006)
5.91*** 0.03*** 5.859*** 0.03*** 5.813***
(1.372) (0.006) (1.374) (0.007) (1.366)
Size: 50–250 0.071***
(0.010)
7.803***
(1.325)
0.073***
(0.011)
7.796***
(1.338)
0.073***
(0.011)
7.774***
(1.331)
Size: 250 < 0.268***
(0.035)
11.106***
(1.804)
0.272***
(0.036)
11.085***
(1.812)
0.277***
(0.036)
11.135***
(1.814)
Export 0.006***
(0.002)
2.543
(1.038)
0.006***
(0.002)
2.636**
(1.062)
0.007***
(0.002)
2.752**
(1.077)
Foreign ownership 10 % < –0.003***
(0.001)
–1.386**
(0.659)
–0.003***
(0.001)
–1.331**
(0.647)
–0.003**
(0.001)
–1.285**
(0.646)
Constant –24.656***
(4.765)
–21.825***
(4.039)
–21.249***
(3.912)
Observations 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575
Pseudo R2 0.343 0.220 0.340 0.217 0.338 0.215
Log Likelihood –724.4 –1265 –727.6 –1268 –729.6 –1272
Note: The dependent variable of the probit models indicates whether the firm in question performed R&D activity in 2005. The 
dependent variable of the tobit models show the R&D intensity of firms (in %). For the probit models, the table shows the average 
marginal effects at the sample mean. We calculated competition variables for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also include 
two-digit industry dummies. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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(U-shaped) relationship with the firms’ R&D probability. These variables can be 
regarded as the measures of the threat of entry. It is in connection with this vari-
able, that the model of Aghion et al. [2009] sets forth a prediction that is contrary 
to our results.7
As for the financial variables, the return on equity (ROE) is in a concave (albeit 
not inverted-U shaped) relationship with innovation efforts. Falling in line with the 
above calculations, the ROA obtained from the competition statistics database of 
the Hungarian Competition Authority is not significant, either. Finally, the presence 
of foreign-owned firms, the indicator is also shown to have an inverted-U shaped 
relationship with competition.
In sum, the empirical results show that in Hungary there is a detectable in-
verted-U shaped relationship between competition and innovation at both the 
industry and firm levels. Competition increases innovation, yet R&D intensity is 
somewhat lower in industries where competition is very strong than in industries 
with medium-strength competition. The result can be interpreted as a causal im-
pact inasmuch as lagged explanatory variables yield the same result. The analysis 
of a wide range of competition indicators evidences the importance of the method 
of measuring competition: the concentration indicators, the industrial dynamics, 
ROE and the ratio of foreigners are in significant relationship with the probability 
of R&D activity in firms.
CONCLUSIONS
This study presents an overview of the key theories and empirical results related 
to the relationship between competition and innovation. Our study contributes to 
the ongoing debates in Hungary by sharing information on empirical results with 
respect to this relationship.
In recent decades, research on innovation has been calling attention to the re-
quirement that the inputs to and the results of innovation need to be distinguished 
and dealt with separately. The difference between the two is important, especially 
in countries which are not among the technologically most advanced ones in the 
world. For instance, the number of Hungarian firms that introduced innovations in 
2006 was three times as high as the number of those that performed R&D activity 
continuously in the preceding years (Halpern–Muraközy [2010]).
Theoretical models explaining the relationship between competition and inno-
vation have a long history. Schumpeter’s theory holds that large firms often perform 
R&D more efficiently and, as a result, some market power is required for a firm to 
implement a large number of innovations. Important new developments were pre-
 7 However, this relationship can be explained by other circumstances. For example, it is possible that 
the entry and exit rates are higher in countries with several, geographically segmented markets.
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sented by Aghion et al. [2005]. Their empirical models yielded inverted-U shaped 
relationships, which suggest that innovative activity is lower in firms that operate 
either in highly concentrated or highly competitive industries than in firms in mod-
erately competitive sectors of the economy.
The measurement of the relationship between competition and innovation raises 
a number of problems. In addition to the difficulties related to measuring the explan-
atory and dependent variables, another grave issue is presented by the simultaneity 
of the relationship between competition and innovation.
As evidenced by research in the 1990s, growing competition, in general, strength-
ens corporate innovation. In the 2000s, some authors came to the conclusion that 
the relationship is non-linear but an inverted-U shaped relationship can be fre-
quently established.
We analyzed an extensive set of data on Hungarian firms, based on methods we 
derived from leading international literary sources. The main conclusion from our 
efforts is that the inverted-U shaped relationship can indeed be established at the 
industry-level as well as at the firm-level. By applying several competition indica-
tors to our models, we also discovered that only certain types of indicators of the 
presence and intensity of competition seem to have had an impact on the innovative 
investments of firms.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 • Sample size
Industries Number of employees in sample
Total1–25 25–50 50–250 250 < 
employees in company
Manufacture of food products and beverages 549 222 279 61 1111
Manufacture of tobacco products 1 0 2 2 5
Manufacture of textiles 137 45 48 10 240
Manufacture of wearing apparel 186 85 115 24 410
Tanning and dressing of leather 50 26 41 9 126
Manufacture of wood and wood products 316 72 47 6 441
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 68 27 33 8 136
Publishing and printing 372 76 63 9 520
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0 0 0 3 3
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products 107 34 44 19 204
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 319 107 124 18 568
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 172 55 60 19 306
Manufacture of basic metals 40 17 38 10 105
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 738 246 177 15 1176
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 442 137 167 29 775
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 19 7 7 3 36
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 132 45 66 47 290
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus
79 23 30 25 157
 Manufacture of instruments 192 38 47 7 284
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 51 28 37 37 153
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 11 11 8 65
Manufacture of furniture 273 81 64 6 424
Recycling 25 7 8 0 40
Total 4,303 1,389 1,508 375 7,575
TABLE A2 • Summary statistics of key variables
Dummy Value of variable
0 1
Performs 
innovation
7,319 256
Foreign ownership 
> 10 %
6,025 1,550
Exports 3,503 4,072
Continuous variables Number of 
observations
Average Median Standard 
Deviation
R&D intensity for all firms 7,575 0.001 0.000 0.009
R&D intensity for firms 
that perform R&D
7,575 0.022 0.007 0.044
Labour productivity 7,575 3.419 2.292 4.834
Added value 7,575 498.25 49.56 7265.98
Capital intensity 7,575 4.318 2.182 7.805
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TABLE A3 • Nonlinear impact of competition on the R&D of firms  
(lagged explanatory variables)
Variable Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Concentration (C3) 0.010
(0.008)
6.262*
(3.464)
Concentration2 (C3)2 –0.005
(0.008)
–4.248
(3.522)
Herfindahl index 0.023**
(0.012)
11.838**
(4.970)
Herfindahl index2 –0.030*
(0.016)
–16.616**
(6.764)
Average ROA in industry 0.014
(0.042)
8.188
(19.164)
ROA2 0.109
(0.286)
41.334
(130.920)
Labour productivity 0.000*
(0.000)
0.093
(0.062)
0.000
(0.000)
0.090
(0.061)
0.000
(0.000)
0.089
(0.061)
Log capital intensity 0.002***
(0.001)
0.685**
(0.287)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.697**
(0.289)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.715**
(0.295)
Size: 25–50 0.027***
(0.006)
5.19***
(1.086)
0.027***
(0.006)
5.18***
(1.091)
0.026***
(0.006)
5.125***
(1.089)
Size: 50–250 0.068***
(0.009)
7.483***
(1.122)
0.067***
(0.009)
7.448***
(1.124)
0.068***
(0.009)
7.457***
(1.135)
Size: 250 < 0.290***
(0.032)
11.118***
(1.698)
0.291***
(0.032)
11.15***
(1.715)
0.3***
(0.032)
11.313***
(1.758)
Export 0.006***
(0.002)
2.518**
(1.038)
0.006***
(0.002)
2.582**
(1.048)
0.006***
(0.002)
2.559**
(1.044)
Foreign ownership > 10% –0.004***
(0.001)
–1.622**
(0.766)
–0.004***
(0.001)
–1.625**
(0.762)
–0.004***
(0.001)
–1.585**
(0.757)
Constant –21.67***
(4.035)
–21.105***
(3.880)
–21.195***
(3.990)
Observations 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575
Pseudo R2 0.358 0.223 0.358 0.223 0.358 0.223
Log Likelihood –708.3 –1,259 –708.2 –1,260 –708.5 –1,260
Note: The dependent variable of the probit models indicates whether the firm performed R&D activity in 2005. The dependent 
variable of the tobit models shows the R&D intensity of firms (in %). For the probit models, the Table shows the marginal effects 
for the sample mean. We calculated competition variables for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also include two-digit 
industry dummies. The explanatory variables are from 2003. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
136 László Halpern–Balázs Muraközy
TABLE A4 • Non-linear impact of competition indicators on the R&D activity of firms  
(with NACE4 quadratic term)
Competition indicator Beta Standard  
error
Beta  
squared
Standard  
error
Number of firms –0.00098 0.00037** 0.00000 0.00000**
Concentration (C3) on the basis of net sales 0.02706*** 0.00780** –0.00022 0.00007***
Concentration (C3) on the basis of total assets 0.02094 0.00739** –0.00015 0.00006**
Concentration (C5) on the basis of net sales turnover 0.02647*** 0.00868*** –0.00019 0.00007**
Concentration (C5) on the basis of total assets 0.02457 0.00862** –0.00017 0.00007**
Concentration (C10) on the basis of net sales 0.02830 0.01130** –0.00018 0.00008**
Concentration (C10) on the basis of total assets 0.02936 0.01237** –0.00018 0.00009*
Relative standard deviation of shares on the basis of net sales 0.02166 0.00848** –0.00020 0.00008**
Relative standard deviation of shares on the basis of total assets 0.01609 0.00798* –0.00012 0.00007
HHI on the basis of net sales 0.00009 0.00007 –0.00000 0.00000
HHI on the basis of total assets 0.00010 0.00007 –0.00000 0.00000
C3 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 1)# 0.01384 0.0967 –0.00007 0.00008
C3 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 2)# –0.00436 0.00823 0.00000 0.00011
C5 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 1)# 0.01687 0.01043 –0.00009 0.00009
C5 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 2)# –0.00683 0.00774 0.00005 0.00010
HHI on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 1)# 0.00004 0.00007 0.00000 0.00000
HHI on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 2)# –0.00026 0.00015 0.00000 0.00000**
Domestic consumption 0.00000 0.00000** –0.00000 0.00000**
Domestic consumption (% of net sales) 0.00067 0.00040 –0.00000 0.00000
Import categorized on the basis of products (% of domestic 
consumption)
0.00523 0.00782 0.00002 0.00007
Share of large firms in industry sales 0.00804 0.00504 –0.00006 0.00005
Share of medium firms in industry sales –0.00584 0.00628 0.00006 0.00007
Share of small and micro firms in industry sales 0.00155 0.00823 –0.00009 0.0012
Share of large firms in industry total assets 0.00648 0.00497 –0.00004 0.00005
Share of medium firms in industry total assets –0.00785 0.00627 0.00009 0.00007
Share of small and micro firms in industry total assets –0.00710 0.00766 0.00001 0.00011
Ratio of the turnover of small firms to that of large firms –0.04793 0.03223 0.00083 0.00107
Share of import in the industry total supply 0.00075 0.00038 –0.00000 0.00000
Number of firms entering the market in the given year –0.01014 0.00315*** 0.00004 0.00002**
Number of firms exiting the market in the given year –0.01375 0.00485** 0.00009 0.00003**
Ratio of entering firms in year t –0.00792 0.02294 –0.00012 0.00071
Ratio of exiting firms in year t 0.02923 0.02922 –0.00041 0.00119
Drop-out rate in year t 0.01442 0.01448 –0.00019 0.00024
Net turnover of the sale of dissolved firms in year t (% of total industry 
turnover in year t) 
–0.06895 0.04960 0.00286 0.00264
Assets of dissolved firms in year t (% of total industry assets in year t) –0.05556 0.01707*** 0.00143 0.00045***
Net turnover of the sale of new entrants in year t (% of total industry 
turnover in year t)
0.00269 0.05794 –0.00268 0.00576
Assets of new entrants in year t (% of total industry assets in year t) 0.00442 0.03847 –0.00238 0.00272
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Competition indicator Beta Standard  
error
Beta  
squared
Standard  
error
Profitability of exiting firms compared to the profitability of those that 
stay in the market
0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000
Productivity of exiting firms compared to the productivity of those that 
stay in the market
–0.00194 0.00118 0.00000 0.00001
Number of firms not included in the sample –0.00393 0.00141** 0.00001 0.00000*
Industrial output price index –0.26605 0.31791 0.00133 0.00158
Domestic sales price index 0.55400 0.38505 –0.00275 0.00189
Export sales price index 0.00030 0.10754 0.00005 0.00055
EBIT ratio –0.00124 0.01770 0.00043 0.00077
EBITDA ratio 0.00918 0.02381 –0.00007 0.00080
Return on equity before tax (ROE1) –0.00439 0.00153** –0.00000 0.00000**
Return on equity after tax (ROE2) –0.00430 0.00148** –0.00000 0.00000**
Balance sheet earnings on equity (ROE3) –0.00358 0.00165* –0.00000 0.00000**
Return on capital employed (ROCE) 0.01231 0.01209 –0.00059 0.00037
Return on Sales (ROS) –0.00700 0.01690 0.00085 0.00069
Return on Investment (ROI) 0.00353 0.00310 –0.00002 0.00004
Return on Asset (ROA) 0.01141 0.01235 –0.00029 0.00094
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 0.01106 0.01449 –0.00068 0.00063
Industry loss (% of net turnover) –0.09287 0.03208** 0.00687 0.00207***
Gross added value per capita 0.01702 0.02602 0.00015 0.00071
Gross added value per unit labour cost 0.00142 0.00223 –0.00000 0.00000
Relative standard deviation of gross added value per capita 0.00741 0.01058 0.00003 0.00014
Relative standard deviation of gross added value per unit labour cost –0.00891 0.00967 0.00014 0.00012
Simple arithmetic mean of gross added value per capita 0.24613 0.08342*** –0.01921 0.00641***
Simple arithmetic mean of gross added value per unit labour cost –0.00040 0.00030 0.00000 0.00000***
Total factor productivity (TFP) in industry 0.00926 0.05413 –0.00175 0.00278
Relative standard deviation of total factor productivity –0.00030 0.00997 –0.000003 0.00016
Simple arithmetic mean of total factor productivity of firms in industry 0.01017 0.01809 –0.00006 0.00020
Productivity of smaller firms compared to that of large firms –0.00191 0.00474 –0.00002 0.00007
Numerator of the indicator of the relationship between profitability and 
productivity
0.00260 0.00598 0.000000 0.00005
Denominator of the indicator of the relationship between profitability 
and productivity
–0.00135 0.02207 0.00028 0.00094
Export share in industry total demand 0.00042 0.00067 0.00000 0.00000
Renewal of assets on the basis of implemented investments –0.00570 0.01742 0.00036 0.00036
Rate of foreign ownership in subscribed capital 0.01691 0.00693** –0.00015 0.00007**
Net turnover of sales in industry 0.00000 0.00000 –0.00000 0.00000
Size of industry 0.00081 0.00202 –0.00000 0.00001
Cost disadvantage ratio 0.00470 0.00456 –0.00003 0.00003
Note: For each variable, the probit model referred to in Table A3 was estimated. The table shows the average marginal effect of the 
competition indicator at the sample average. Competition variables were calculated for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also 
include two-digit industry dummies. The explanatory variables are from 2003. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
# For the description of the two hypotheses, see: http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&st=1&pg=54&m5_doc=5635&m251_act=4.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
